Ciudad Juárez acquires video surveillance equipment from Chinese companies banned by the U.S.

06/07/2023

Translated from Spanish

While the United States bans the acquisition of Chinese technology for mass video surveillance due to national security risks, these devices are being used on the Mexican side of the border. Cities in four northern Mexican states have facial recognition equipment with capabilities for mass surveillance and at least one, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, purchased Dahua and Hikvision devices in 2022. These brands were banned by the U.S. government in 2021 due to an alleged espionage threat that the Chinese government has denied for years. But these Chinese companies are also accused by governments and international organizations of contributing to the repression of ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang, where there are cases of torture, sexual abuse, and forcer labor, and where both brands have had operational linksto the region. As a result of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the three North American countries assumed commitments to prohibit the importation of products made with forced labor, but this has not prevented Mexico from acquiring them.

By Elizabeth Rosales

Along Mexico’s northern border, four states employ facial recognition video surveillance systems for public security and forensic investigations: Chihuahua, Coahuila, Baja California, and Nuevo León. During research for this article, which is the first part of a special series on forced labor, Empower found that at least two of these Mexican states acquired the equipment of two Chinese brands that were banned in the United States for posing espionage risks. In addition, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) have called out these brands for contributing to the human rights violations of ethnic minorities in China, such as the Uyghur, a Muslim community that has been tortured and imprisoned in concentration camps.

As of 2021,¹ no federal agency in the U.S. can purchase mass surveillance equipment for public safety purposes if it was manufactured by Chinese brands, including Dahua and Hikvision.

But on the Mexican side, Chihuahua and Coahuila purchased equipment from these brands in 2022 and 2019, respectively, through intermediaries. Additionally, Empower found that Nuevo León acquired equipment with facial recognition capabilities in 2020² from a Mexican company that, on its social networks, advertises the sale of Hikvision products.³ Empower was unable to confirm the brand of these cameras given that the Government of Nuevo León classified such information and blacked-out parts of the acquisition contract, arguing a possible IT vulnerability, along with denying several interview requests since 2021 for our article “Careful! You’re being watched: Mexican police use facial recognition technology for mass surveillance.”⁴

As explained in that earlier article, the collection of biometric data, such as irises, fingerprints, voice, and facial features, is of concern to human rights advocates because of its potential use to persecute opposition figures and because it fuels racially biased facial recognition systems that discriminate.

Some of the main suppliers of these technologies are of Chinese origin and are currently used to monitor and repress ethnic minorities such as the Uyghur. In 2018, the UN estimated that at least one million Uyghurs had been held in indoctrination camps where they are monitored by facial recognition cameras, tortured, and forced to work.⁵

According to international human rights law and standards, companies should not contribute to human rights abuses and they should monitor how their products are used, said Maya Wang, associate director of the Asia division at Human Rights Watch, a human rights organization, in an interview with Empower.

For this current article, Empower submitted 28 freedom of information requests to agencies in states and border cities in northern Mexico, finding that, while the United States has banned the use of these technologies for national security reasons, they are nevertheless used in Mexico.

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency that publishes and updates the “List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act”, including restricted communications technologies in the United States, did not respond to a request for a comment.

Chihuahua uses technologies from companies banned in the U.S.

In Chihuahua, only the border city of Juárez responded to Empower that its Municipal Public Security Secretariat acquired, in May 2022, Dahua and Hikvision⁶ branded devices through the companies INT Intelligence and Telecom Technologies México, S.A. de C.V.,⁷ and Novitech, S.A. de C.V.⁸

According to public contracts DCA/SSPM/161/2022 and DCA/SSPM/162/2022, the first company provided and installed a total of 1,000 video surveillance cameras at 250 intelligent monitoring points (PMI, in Spanish), while the second company provided complementary services.

The Municipal Secretariat replied to Empower, through freedom of information requests, that the cost of “the devices” cannot be calculated since “said acquisition was carried out through an integral project;” however, the first contract states the amount of 61,310,877 Mexican pesos for the purchase of cameras, while the second assigns a total of 25,789,479.75 Mexican pesos to the supplier.

Just like this city in Chihuahua, the state of Coahuila was reported, in 2020, by the media organization Quinto Elemento Lab, to have biometric video surveillance equipment after acquiring 1,300 Dahua cameras.⁹

Among the most recent freedom of information requests submitted by Empower, the Saltillo Security and Citizen Protection Police Station, in Coahuila, responded that, in March 2022, it issued a call for bids to acquire 211 new surveillance cameras with facial recognition capabilities under tender No. CSPC-LC-05-2022, although the agency ignored Empower’s express request to provide the contract. In addition, its communications area, like that of Ciudad Juárez, did not respond to several requests for interviews or comments.

In Baja California this technology is not yet ready for use, while Sonora denies its purchase

In Baja California, the General Secretariat of Government (SGG, in Spanish) delivered to Empower a contract for 4,416,120 Mexican pesos,¹⁰ which was awarded in 2021 to the company Coedra, S.A. de C.V. for the acquisition of technology with facial recognition capabilities for the State Commission for the Search of Missing Persons.

The SGG explained through a freedom of information request that the acquisition was for software to identify corpses and missing persons, and another software that records and shows the measurements of human skulls, three-dimensional modeling, and aging of photographs in order to consult similarities with a database of missing persons. In none of these cases, however, did it specify the brand or origin of these programs.

Local media organizations, such as Semanario Zeta, point out that these acquisitions have not been used or taken advantage of for the stated purpose: to identify missing persons.¹¹ In this regard, the SGG assured Empower that the facial recognition software was installed in January 2022 and that, since then, it has been working to populate a database that, as of the last cut, has a registry of 1,080 people.

“So far no persons have been identified; however, the photographs could generate the identification of someone in the future,” responded the press area of this state agency.

Empower sent Coedra a request to review its product catalog, but the company did not respond by our deadline. This supplier of the Baja California SGG also claims to be a contractor for the border states of Sonora, Nuevo León, and Coahuila.¹² Through several freedom of information requests, Sonora denied acquiring this type of equipment.

Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, classified information

Nuevo León classified its information so as not to disclose details of the acquisition. However, in 2021, Empower identified a contract awarded on December 21, 2020,¹³ to the company Geosoft Solutions, S.A. de C.V., for the supply, installation, configuration, and commissioning of a license for the use of facial recognition software including a gallery for the video surveillance system of the Integral Coordination, Control, Command, Communications, and Computing Center of the State (C5) in Nuevo León. The contract was for 3,582,723.97 million pesos, including taxes.

In its social media, Geosoft discloses that its video surveillance equipment is of the Hikvision brand, which is banned in the United States; however, its legal representative declined to comment.

In a freedom of information request addressed to the Government of the State of Nuevo León, Empower asked about purchases of surveillance cameras with facial recognition capabilities and/or maintenance services over the last 10 years, but it replied that “it is not possible to affirm or deny that it has or does not have such technological equipment, since the requested information is reserved under the protection of the Reserve Agreement 004- AR/S.E.A.F./2018.”

This was also the case of Tamaulipas, where the State Attorney General’s Office refused to answer whether or not it has facial recognition technology given that, on May 28, 2021, it was classified as reserved information.

Threats to U.S. national security and human rights violations

In November 2022,¹⁴ the FCC issued new rules to ban equipment authorizations for Chinese telecommunications and video surveillance equipment deemed to pose a threat to national security, such as those from Huawei Technologies, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, and Dahua Technologies, as well as any subsidiaries or affiliates of these brands.

Although these restrictions are not retroactive and therefore do not affect previous authorizations, the FCC affirmed its interest in a press release¹⁵ to take action against existing authorizations, given the risks they represent.

“Manufacturers of electronic equipment in China may be compromised by Chinese security agencies. They may remotely access devices and use them for espionage,” Jorge Sebastian Sierra, a member of the Center for Internet Security and a contributor to the Border Center for Journalists and Bloggers, where he teaches digital security, told Empower.

For now, the FCC maintains a “Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program” to remove any “unsafe” equipment that has been installed in the country by federal agencies. It has also revoked operating permits from Chinese state-owned companies.

“The FCC is committed to protecting our national security by ensuring that untrustworthy communications equipment is not authorized for use within our borders,” Commission Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a statement.¹⁶

The Secure Equipment Act of 2021¹⁷ empowers the FCC to ban certain devices in order to protect the U.S. national network and prevent espionage by governments such as China, although the latter has repeatedly denied such allegations.

“For some time now, the United States has deployed its State power to smear and crack down on targeted Chinese companies in an attempt to kill their normal and legal business operations,” said then Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang in 2019, as quoted by CNN.¹⁸

These measures were implemented in the context of statements made by the last two U.S. federal administrations that have called the current situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) a “genocide” by the Chinese government.

According to the U.S. State Department’s report “2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),”¹⁹ ethnic and religious minorities such as the Uyghur have been victims of genocide and crimes against humanity, such as forced sterilization, slave labor, sexual abuse, and arbitrary imprisonment in Xinjiang, acts that have also been denounced by international organizations such as the UN and civil society organizations such as Human Rights Watch.

“I do think the Chinese systems are particularly problematic because, a) they are very affordable, b) they encourage mass surveillance, and c) this is related to the idea of international human rights law which says that government collection of personal data has to be lawful, proportionate, and necessary,” said Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch.

Since 2021, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act restricts the importation of products to the United States made wholly or partially in Xinjiang unless importers can prove that no forced labor was used.

These measures go hand in hand with the clauses signed by Mexico, the United States, and Canada in the USMCA Agreement, which also imposes measures to prevent the importation of products made with forced labor, without specifying the origin.

Under this agreement, the three countries involved would have to investigate the supply chain of the products they import to corroborate that forced labor has not been used. In the case of Dahua and Hikvision, Empower found that both have operational links to the Xinjiang province, a fact that in itself represents a high risk of forced labor.

USMCA, an agreement that addresses forced labor

Five years after the USMCA was signed, Mexico implemented an internal agreement signed by the Secretariat of Economy (SE) and the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS) to enforce the clause in the labor chapter of the USMCA that bans the importation of products made totally or partially with forced labor.

This agreement, which came into effect in May 2023,²⁰ instructs the STPS to review imports ex officio but also when they are denounced and have sufficient elements to raise the suspicion of the use of forced labor. Subsequently, the STPS must request support from the countries where the company in question is located to determine whether or not it is responsible. In the event that the country of origin of a product does not have agreements with Mexico for this purpose, the importer will be responsible for demonstrating that forced labor has not been used in the production of the object to be imported.

Both Dahua and Hikvision have ties to Xinjiang, a province that is itself a cause of suspicion for international authorities given its history of repression and abuses against the Uyghur community.

According to a U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security document dated May 2023,²¹ Dahua has operations in Xinjiang, while Hikvision has among its shareholders the Xinjiang Pukang Investment Limited Partnership,²² which, according to a 2017 Hikvision report, is, or at least was, domiciled in Xinjiang.²³

To verify whether or not they use forced labor, Mexico would then request the country of origin to determine whether either or both firms resort to modern slavery, according to the SE and STPS agreement.

But this route generates conflicts for Cuauhtémoc Mendoza, a labor lawyer who is also an area director of Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, who finds it difficult for the countries of origin and the companies involved to admit to the use of forced labor.

“The company in this country is going to say ’no’ because in the labor legislation of the producing country it may not be considered forced labor,” the lawyer said.

The relationship between China and Mexico, in particular, has been questioned by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, which, in March 2023, published a letter addressed to Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Secretary Marcelo Ebrard expressing concern about Mexico’s participation in what the organization called efforts to whitewash China’s systematic persecution of Uyghurs.

“It has serious implications for Mexico’s international credibility on human rights,” the letter states.²⁴

Days later, Ebrard assured²⁵ that Mexico would not change its relationship with China and would not enter into a political confrontation in light of HRW’s letter.

A measure with legal holes

“What is the big issue we have here? It is that the [SE and STPS agreement] is based only on the USMCA […] formally no legislation of our country was modified,” said lawyer Cuauhtémoc Mendoza, a specialist in international public, labor, civil, trade, and tax law.

The expert pointed out that, although the agreement signed by the SE and STPS establishes that the latter is responsible for determining whether a product has been made with forced labor, this agency does not have the authority to ban the importation of products.

“The only authorities that can prohibit imports are the Secretariat of Economy, the Tax Administration Service (SAT), or the National Customs Agency […] There we are talking about a possible legal flaw,” Mendoza added.

The STPS was asked for details such as the budget allocated for these operations and which department would be responsible for applying it, but did not reply by our deadline.

In addition, the specialist noted that, without a robust legal framework, the application of the SE and STPS agreement will be complicated, as companies could take their cases to court to prevent their interests from being affected.

“On the other hand, we are not generating schemes in which forced labor is eradicated within the country, and why do I say that? Because in Mexico, today, there are regions that continue to replicate these forced labor or child labor schemes,” Mendoza criticized.

In 2021,²⁶ the STPS announced that it was working on a protocol to address this problem, but that same year the Mexican government eliminated social programs that increased access to education and reduced the risk of child labor in marginalized communities.²⁷

The adoption of measures to eradicate modern slavery in their home countries, and not only in supply chains, was also agreed upon in the labor chapter of the USMCA, but this remains a pending issue that calls into question Mexico’s capacity to respond.

“It is something that has to be eradicated at home. In the clandestinity and informality, Mexico continues to have these schemes. I understand that our legislation does not allow it, but informally it continues to exist,” said Mendoza. “On the other hand, it is necessary to pursue the companies that produce these type of products.”

Among the cases that should be prioritized, according to the specialist, are those of companies located in vulnerable areas or with “high” risks of forced labor. Such is the case of Dahua and Hikvision, which have links to Xinjiang without this being taken into account by state and local governments in Mexico when making purchases.

Update:

After our editorial deadline had closed, Adrián Sánchez from the Coordination of Social Communication and Public Relations of the Secretariat of Public Security of Ciudad Juárez sent the following response to our request for comments: “Indeed, the United States has banned many brands of high technology products, not specifically because they are a risk to their national security, although they are included as such, but the point is that they are banned for the simple fact of being Chinese branded products and not because they do not comply with the guidelines or security requirements, while in this city they are highly functional and were installed with the necessary security measures (firewalls) so that there is no risk, as is done with all systems that the Ministry of Public Security uses.”

1 “List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act,” FCC, 20 September 2022, www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.

2 “Contrato de prestación del servicio de suministro, instalación, configuración y puesta en marcha de una licencia para uso de software para el reconocimiento facial con galería incluida para el sistema de videovigilancia del C5, N.L.,” Secretaría de Administración, 21 December 2020, share.mayfirst.org/s/MF5fbCoxPEQH6i4.

3 Screenshot from the Facebook account of Geosoft, S.A. de C.V., Facebook, 19 April 2020, share.mayfirst.org/s/9zFSX6Ejj3GrCTo.

4 “Careful! You’re being watched: Mexican police use facial recognition technology for mass surveillance,” Empower Journalism, 15 December 2021, empowerllc.net/en/2021/12/15/careful-youre-being-watched-mexican-police-use-facial-recognition-technology-for-mass-surveillance.

5 “China Uighurs: one million held in political camps, UN told,” BBC, 10 August 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45147972.

6 “OFICIO No. SSPM/CT/106/2023,” Plataforma Nacional de Transparencia, 25 April 2023, share.mayfirst.org/s/kEKctzSwxWN952G.

7 “No. Contrato DCA/SSPM/161/2022,” Oficialía Mayor de Ciudad Juárez, 2022, juarez.gob.mx/transparencia/docs/dca-sspm-161-2022-int-intelligence-and-telecom-technologies-mexico-reservado-_signed__62d06c551547f__62d06c5515484.pdf.

8 “No. Contrato DCA/SSPM/162/2022,” Oficialía Mayor de Ciudad Juárez, 2022, juarez.gob.mx/transparencia/docs/dca-sspm-162-2022-novitech-reservado-_signed__6320f02902125__6320f02902129.pdf.

9 “Vigilancia biométrica: el tortuoso camino de Coahuila hacia el reconocimiento facial,” Quinto Elemento Lab, 11 November 2020, quintoelab.org/project/vigilancia-biometrica-reconocimiento-facial-coahuila.

10 “Contrato administrativo de adquisición de sistema de software, sistema de análisis de geolocalizaciones y plataforma forense de análisis de datos móviles para la Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Personas para el ejercicio fiscal 2021 de la Secretaría General de Gobierno,” Oficialía Mayor del Gobierno de Baja California, 30 November 2021, share.mayfirst.org/s/5jjbEAm3PASsgGY.

11 “Sobreprecios y malos manejos en la Comisión de Búsqueda,” Semanario Zeta, 30 January 2023, zetatijuana.com/2023/01/sobreprecios-y-malos-manejos-en-la-comision-de-busqueda.

12 “Equipo especializado en búsqueda de personas,” Coedra, undated, www.coedra.org.

13 “SEE/DASG/21-DIC-2020/10:30,” Secretaría de Administración, 21 December 2020, share.mayfirst.org/s/MF5fbCoxPEQH6i4.

14 “Report and order, order, and further notice of proposed rulemaking,” FCC, 11 November 2022, docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-22-84A1.pdf.

15 “FCC Bans Equipment Authorizations for Chinese Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Equipment Deemed to Pose a Threat to National Security,” FCC, 25 November 2022, docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-389524A1.pdf.

16 Ibíd.

17 “H.R.3919 — Secure Equipment Act of 2021,” U.S. Congress, 11 November 2021, www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3919.

18 “China slams US over ‘unreasonable crackdown’ on Huawei,” CNN, 29 January 2019, edition.cnn.com/2019/01/28/business/huawei-us-china-response-intl/index.html.

19 “2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” U.S. Department of State, 2020, www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china.

20 “ACUERDO que establece las mercancías cuya importación está sujeta a regulación a cargo de la Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social,” Diario Oficial de la Federación, 17 February 2023, https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5679955&fecha=17/02/2023.

21 “Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 – ENTITY LIST,” Bureau of Industry and Security, 19 May 2023, www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/2326-supplement-no-4-to-part-744-entity-list-4/file.

22 A twice annual 2021 report published in Mandarin by Hikvision shows Xinjiang Pukang Investment Limited Partnership as a shareholder of Hikvision; however, Hikvision’s 2022 annual report in English says there is a relationship between the two companies, mentioning that Xinjiang Pukang Investment Limited Partnership is owned by a Hikvision shareholder. “Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. Informe Semestral 2021,” Hikvision, 2021, share.mayfirst.org/s/XfBmttW994KnWAQ; and “Hikvision annual report 2022,” Hikvision, 2022, www.hikvision.com/content/dam/hikvision/en/investor-relations/annual-quarterly-reports/2022/FY2022-Financial-ReportEV-.PDF.

23 “Reporte de Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co.,” Hikvision, 2017, static.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2017-09-28/1204007552.PDF.

24 “Letter to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Marcelo Ebrard,” HRW, 3 March 2023, www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/03/letter-secretary-foreign-affairs-marcelo-ebrard.

25 “Marcelo Ebrard: “México no es un país intervencionista,” YouTube, 7 March 2023, www.youtube.com/watch?v=FOxS5VqhHWc.

26 “La STPS refrenda su compromiso por erradicar la Trata de Personas con fines de explotación laboral,” STPS, 30 July 2021, www.gob.mx/stps/prensa/la-stps-refrenda-su-compromiso-por-erradicar-la-trata-de-personas-con-fines-de-explotacion-laboral.

27 “Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports,” U.S. Department of Labor, 2021, www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/mexico.

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